Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1988

Dennis E. McGoldrick, Chatper 7 Bankruptcy
Trustee for the Estate of John A. Cavanaugh, and
Violet P. Cavanaugh v. Gordon D. Walker and
Covevrest Properties, a Utah Limited Partnership :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Douglas J. Payne; Michael L. Chidester; Fabian & Clendenin; Attorney for Substituted Plaintiff and
Respondents.
Richard K. Nebeker; Attorney for Defendants, Counterclaimants and Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, McGoldrick v. Walker, No. 880152.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2096

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

)OCUMCNT
KFU
45.9
'.S9
DOCKET NO.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

MCGOLDRICK,
DENNIS
EJT
Chapter 7 Ban uptcy Trustee
for the Est " of
JOHN
A.
ANAUGH,
and
VIOLET P. C
AUGH,
Case No. 880152
Substituted Tf'l'iintif f
and R e s p o n d e n t
vs.
GORDON
D.
WALKER
and
COVECREST PROPERTIES, A UTAH
LIMITED P A R T M M S H I P ,

Category 16 for
Rule 29 argument

Defendants, C?Pilhterclaimants
and Appellantffiia
* * * * * * *

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

* * * * * * *

An Appeal from a Final Order of
the Third Judicial District Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honorable John A. Rokich
* * * * * * * *

Douglas J . PaTfllft
Michael L. C h i c n s t e r ,
Fabian & Clendc i tin
215 South Staj i S t r e e t
S a l t Lake Cit 1 (Utah 84151
(801) 531-8900
Attorney for
Istituted
P l a i n t i f f and
pondents.

R i c h a r d K. Nebeker
165 South West Temple
S u i t e #400
Salt Lake City, Utah
(801) 328-3521
Attorney for Defendants,
Counterclaimants and
Appellants.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

DENNIS
E.
MCGOLDRICK,
Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee
for the Estate of
JOHN A.
CAVANAUGH, and
VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH,
Case No. 880152
Substituted Plaintiff
and Respondent,
vs.
GORDON
D.
WALKER
and
COVECREST PROPERTIES, A UTAH
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,

Category 16 for
Rule 29 argument

Defendants, Counterclaimants
and Appellants.
* * * * * * *

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

* * * * * * *

An Appeal from a Final Order of
the Third Judicial District Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honorable John A. Rokich
* * * * * * * *

Douglas J. Payne
Michael L. Chidester,
Fabian & Clendenin
215 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
(801) 531-8900
Attorney for Substituted
Plaintiff and Respondents.

Richard K. Nebeker
165 South West Temple
Suite #400
Salt Lake City, Utah
(801) 328-3521
Attorney for Defendants,
Counterclaimants and
Appellants.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Authorities and Cases

3

Jurisdictional Statement

4

_

Statement of Issue and Standard of Review

4

Applicable Statutory Provisions

5

Statement of the Case

6

Statement of the Facts

7

Summary of Arguments

11

Arguments

13

POINT I.
THE VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUST IS VOID AS AGAINST
WALKER'S JUDGMENT WITH RESPECT TO REAL PROPERTY AND PROCEEDS
THEREOF, AS WELL AS PERSONAL PROPERTY, PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 25-1-4 (1953) AS AMENDED, AND THE CASE LAW THEREON..13
POINT II.
THE FACTS ARE SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT
CAVANAUGHS HAD ACTUAL INTENT TO DEFRAUD THEIR CREDITOR AND
THE VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUST SHOULD BE DECLARED VOID AS
TO ALL ASSETS PURSUANT TO U.C.A. 25-1-7 (1953) AS AMENDED
15
POINT III. THE BASIS UPON WHICH THE DISTRICT COURT DID UPHOLD
THE CAVANAUGH TRUST AS AGAINST THE WALKER JUDGMENT IS ERRONEOUS
AND LEACH vs. ANDERSON SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE REAL
PROPERTY
19
POINT IV.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 25-1-6 (1953) AS AMENDED
PROVIDES ANOTHER STATUTORY BASIS TO VOID THE CAVANAUGH TRUST
WITH RESPECT TO THE REAL PROPERTY CASH PROCEEDS CONTAINED
THEREIN
24
POINT V.
PUBLIC POLICY PROHIBITS AN OWNER OF REAL OR PERSONAL
PROPERTY FROM PLACING THAT PROPERTY BEYOND THE REACH
OF HIS CREDITORS WHILE HE CONTINUES TO BENEFIT AND ENJOY IT...25
POINT VI.
THERE IS NO RATIONAL BASIS TO DISTINGUISH REAL FROM
PERSONAL PROPERTY IN THIS CASE AND THE VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH
TRUST SHOULD BE DECLARED VOID AS TO BOTH TYPES OF PROPERTY
31
- 2 -

Conclusion and Relief Sought

33

Addendums
35
Memorandum Decision of Judge Rokich
A
Order Partially Invalidating The Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust.B
Stipulation To Sell Real Property with title report
C
Utah Code Annotated 25-6-5
D
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES AND CASES
1.

Dahnken. Inc. of Salt Lake vs. Wilmarth 726 P.2nd
420 (Utah 1986)

15, 16, 17

2.

GEARY vs. CAIN. 9 P.2nd 396 (Utah 1932)

19, 20, 21, 31

3.

Leach vs. Anderson, 535 P.2nd 1241 (Utah 1975).21,22,23,25

4.

Mackason's Appeal. 42 Pa. 330 at 338, (1862)

5.

McColaan v. Walter Magee, Inc., 172 Cal.182,
155 p.995 (1916)

29

27

6.

Meyer v General American Corp., 569 P.2 1094, (Ut.1977).14

7.

Nelson v California Trust Co.. 33 Cal.2d 501,202
P. 2nd 1021 (1949)
Schenck v. Barnes 50 N.E. 967, N.Y. 316, 321,

8.

41 L.R.A. 395, 1898

26, 27
29

37 Am Jur 2d, page 720; Section 27 and 28

26

44 Harvard Law Review 205, Erwin Griswold

27

Scott on Trusts, Vol.11, Sec 156, p. 1092

28

Bogert, Trust and Trustees, (2d Ed.), Sec 223, at p.438

28

Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts, page 543

28

Restatement of Trusts Second, Section 156, p.326,
U.C.A. 25-1-4
U.C.A. 25-1-6
U.C.A. 25-1-7
U.C.A. 25-1-11
- 3 -

30
13
24
15
21

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear this appeal
is embodied in Article VIII, section 9 of the Constitution of
the State of Utah and codified in U.C.A. 78-2-2 (3)(j).

STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue presented to this Court is whether real property
and proceeds thereof, transferred by John A. Cavanaugh and
Violet P. Cavanaugh, at the commencing of this litigation, into
the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust, is now subject to the judgment
lien of the appellant, Gordon D Walker.
The specific real property is a 16 unit apartment complex
located at 130 East Avenue 42, in Los Angeles, California. This
property was
Trustee,

Mr.

sold

by

Dennis

the

Cavanaugh's

McGoldrick,

the

Chapter

7 Bankruptcy

substituted

plaintiff

herein. The cash proceeds of the sale are being held by Mr.
McGoldrick pending the outcome of this appeal. If the Walker
judgment lien did attach to the real property transferred to the
Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust, then Walker is a secured creditor
with a priority to the proceeds of the sale of the apartment
complex. If Walker's judgment lien did not so attach, because
the real property was lawfully placed in the Cavanaugh Trust,
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then Walker is an unsecured creditor with no priority to the
cash proceeds.
The standard of review is whether an error of law was
committed when the District Court
Violet

P.

Cavanaugh

Trust

and

failed to invalidate the

allow

Appellant

Walker,

a

legitimate judgment creditor, to execute on the real property
transferred to the Trust.

APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
At

the time of the District Court's

Decision

in this

matter, Utah Code Annotated 25-1-1, et. seq. (1953) as amended,
"Fraudulent Conveyances" was applicable. Appellants rely on the
following four sections of this Fraudulent Conveyance Statute
in this appeal:
Section
25-1-4:
"Conveyances
by
insolvent. Every
conveyance made, and every obligation incurred, by a person
which is, or will be thereby rendered, insolvent is fraudulent
as to creditors, without regard to his actual intent, if the
conveyance is made or the obligation is incurred without a fair
consideration."
Section 25-1-6:
"Conveyances by persons about to incur
debts. Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred,
without fair consideration, when the person making the
conveyance or entering into the obligation intends to, or
believes that he will, incur debts beyond his ability to pay as
they mature, is fraudulent as to both present and future
creditors."
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Section 25-1-7:
"Conveyance to hinder, delay, defraud
creditors. Every conveyance made, and every obligation incurred,
with actual intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in
law, to hinder, delay or defraud either present or future
creditors is fraudulent as to both present and future
creditors."
Section 25-1-11:
"Trust for Grantor void. All deeds,
gifts, conveyances, transfers or assignments verbal or written,
of goods, chattel, or things in action made in trust for the use
of the person making the same shall be void as against the
existing or subsequent creditors of such person."
These four sections of the code were repealed

by the

Legislative session of 1988 and replaced by Utah's adoption of
the "Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act."

The Uniform Fraudulent

Transfer Act did not apply retroactively but became effective on
April 25, 1988, six weeks after the Final Order which is the
subject

of

this

appeal.

Appellant

relies

on

The

Uniform

Fraudulent Transfer Act in this brief for argumentative purposes
only.

Section 25-6-5 is attached as Addendum D hereto.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case was tried before a jury during the week of May
19, 1987. The jury found for the defendant, Gordon D. Walker,
who had counterclaims against the plaintiffs, John and Violet
Cavanaugh. A judgment was entered in Walkers favor in the sum of
$836,446.97.
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At the commencing of the litigation in the District Court,
the plaintiffs, John and Violet Cavanaugh, transferred all their
assets

into the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust. After the jury

verdict, and when

it became known that

the

assets of the

Cavanaugh7s had been transferred into a Trust, Walker sought to
void the Trust so that he could collect on his judgment.
The Honorable John A. Rokich invalidated the Violet P.
Cavanaugh Trust so far as the personal property contained in the
Trust was concerned. However, on the basis of Geary v. Cain, 9
P. 2nd 396 (Utah 1932), Judge Rokich held that the Violet P.
Cavanaugh Trust was valid as to the real property and that
Walker could not execute on the apartment complex transferred
into the Trust. It is this portion of Judge Rokich7s decision
that appellants seek to have reversed.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This

action

commenced

on

February

26, 1985, when the

plaintiff Cavanaughs filed a complaint against the defendant
Gordon D. Walker in the Third Judicial District Court. On the
10th day of April, 1986, Gordon D. Walker filed a complaint
against

Cavanaughs

promissory note.

seeking

foreclosure

and

collection

on a

The action of the Cavanaughs filed in February

1985 and the action of Gordon D. Walker filed in April 1986 were
- 7 -

consolidated into one action by a Court Order on the 22nd day of
April 1986.

Walker was thereafter designated as the counter-

claimant.
During the week of May 19, 1987, a trial by Jury between
the parties took place and a judgment in the sum of $836,446.97
along with a Decree of foreclosure was thereupon entered in
favor of Gordon D. Walker and against both John and Violet
Cavanaugh. (R-339).

After obtaining judgment, Walker learned

that the Cavanaugh7s real property assets had been transferred
by Mr. and Mrs. Cavanaugh into the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust on
April 10, 1986, the same day that Walker commenced his legal
action against the Cavanaughs.. (R-452, par-2).

In fact, all the

real and personal property assets of Cavanaughs were transferred
into the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust. (R-408).
Immediately
Walker

recorded

upon
a

obtaining judgment

lien

on

the

against Cavanaughs,

apartment

complex

Cavanaughs in Los Angeles. (Addendum C, page 6).

owned by

On June 12,

1987, Cavanaughs sought to protect their equity in the apartment
complex by placing eight separate Trust Deeds on the property
with insiders named as beneficiaries. The total principal sum of
these Trust Deeds exceeds $220,000. (Addendum C, page 7 and 8).
On the 6th day of August 1987, a Deficiency Judgment was
entered in favor of Gordon D. Walker and against Cavanaughs in
- 8 -

the sum of $779,537.74. (R-372).

On

September

17,

1987,

a

Motion and Order in Supplemental Proceedings was issued and
subsequently heard on November 13, 1987, before Judge Rokich.
(R-375 and R-380).

The purpose of the supplemental proceeding

was to invalidate the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust and enable
Gordon D. Walker to collect his deficiency judgment against the
assets

of

the Cavanaughs now being

Cavanaugh Trust. (R-376 and 405).

Mr.

held

in the Violet P.

and

Mrs.

Cavanaugh

testified at the supplemental proceeding and were cross-examined
concerning the creation of the Trust and its assets. (R-380).
Judge

Rokich

thereafter

issued

a

Memorandum

Decision

only

partially invalidating the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust. (R-388).
Judge Rokich ruled that the personal property transferred into
trust could be attached by Walker's judgment, however, he went
on to rule that the real property transferred into trust could
not so be attached. (R-388 and R-476).
The Memorandum Decision of Judge Rokich, dated February 16,
1988, contains the following nine findings of fact:
"The court found the facts to be as follows;
1. No consideration was given to Mrs. Cavanaugh for the
transfer of the Trust assets into the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust.
2. The Trust property of the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust has
been treated no differently after the transfer into the Trust
than it was before.
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3. Mrs, Cavanaugh retains full control over the trust
property, including the right to modify, amend or revoke the
Trust at any time.
4. Mrs. Cavanaugh has the full and complete enjoyment and
benefit of the Trust property for the duration of her life.
5. Mrs. Cavanaugh may transfer the Trust property at any
time for any purpose.
6. Mrs. Cavanaugh is the beneficiary of all Trust property
and proceeds.
7. The alleged sole purpose for the Trust was to provide
for tax benefits.
8. At present, Violet P. Cavanaugh is the sole Trustee and
will remain so for the duration of her life.
9. A true and correct copy of the Trust is attached hereto,
and the Trust itself substantiates the above representation."
(R-339). [Copy of Trust omitted, but located at R-407)
The entire Memorandum

Decision of Judge Rokich is attached

hereto as addendum A. This Memorandum Decision was entered as a
final Order on March 16, 1988 and a copy of the Order is
attached hereto as addendum B.

(Memorandum Decision at R-388

and Order at R-476).
When

Walker

garnishment

and

commenced

collection

attachment

of

of

personal

his

judgment

property

by

assets,

Cavanaughs immediately filed bankruptcy in The United States
Bankruptcy Court, Central District Of California. (Notice of
Bankruptcy filed with Utah Supreme Court on or about July 11,
1988).

The

Chapter

7

Trustee,

Dennis

McGoldrick,

took

possession of all the assets of the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust,
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including the real property. Mr. McGoldrick, as trustee, revoked
the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust and commenced to sell the real
property apartment. On or about November 2, 1988, the apartment
complex of the Cavanaughs

in Los Angeles was sold and the

approximate cash sum of $675,000 was placed with the Bankruptcy
Trustee. (Attached hereto as addendum C is a true and correct
copy of a notice of sale of this property by the trustee coupled
with a title report fully describing the property and liens
thereon).
On March 1, 1991 an Order was entered in the Bankruptcy
Court lifting the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy
Code

for

the

sole

purpose

of

allowing

this

appeal

to be

concluded so that a determination of Walker's interest in the
cash

proceeds

determined.

of

the

sale

of

the

real

property

could

be

On April 15, 1991, Dennis McGoldrick, the Chapter 7

Bankruptcy Trustee for the bankrupt estate of John and Violet
Cavanaugh, was substituted as plaintiff and respondent in this
action.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellants
because

Walker

contend

in POINT

was

creditor

a

I of
of

their

Cavanaughs

argument
and

that

because

Cavanaughs conveyances to trust were without consideration and
- 11 -

rendered them insolvent, the trust should be declared void to
permit Walker to collect on his judgment, regardless of any
actual intent to defraud.
Appellants contend in POINT II of their argument that there
are sufficient

"badges or indicia" of

an actual fraudulent

conveyance and that for this reason the Cavanaugh Trust should
also be declared void as against Walker's judgment. Those badges
of fraud are (1) continuing in use and property ownership after
the

transfer;

(2) conveyance

at

the

commencement

of

this

litigation; (3) a transfer to a family member, ie: the same
Violet

P.

Cavanaugh

as

is

the

defendant;

and

(4)

no

consideration for the transfer.
Appellants contend in POINT III of their argument that the
legal basis upon which the lower Court did uphold the Cavanaugh
Trust was an error. Appellants argue that the 1975 Utah Supreme
Court case of Leach vs. Anderson should be expanded to include
real property and that Section 25-1-11 of U.C.A. (1953), with
it's reference to "Deeds" should include real property. Also on
this point, the 1931 Geary v. Cain case, relied on by the lower
Court, is easily distinguished because in Geary the transfer of
property was an outright conveyance of title, without limitation
or restriction, to a third party.
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Appellants contend in POINT IV of their argument that the
Cavanaughs knew they owed Walker $422,000 with interest on a
promissory note and that the note was due. Cavanaughs conveyed
real property to trust without consideration in anticipation of
incurring a debt beyond their ability to pay.
Appellants contend in POINT V of their argument that public
policy and overwhelming legal authority prohibit a person from
placing his property beyond the reach of creditors while at the
same time allowing that person to retain an interest and control
over the property.
Appellants contend in POINT VI of their argument that there
is no rational basis to distinguish real property from personal
property for purposes of this case.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUST IS VOID AS AGAINST

WALKER'S JUDGMENT WITH RESPECT TO REAL PROPERTY AND PROCEEDS
THEREOF, AS WELL AS PERSONAL PROPERTY, PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 25-1-4 (1953) AS AMENDED, AND THE CASE LAW THEREON.

Section 25-1-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953 states:
"Conveyances by insolvent. Every conveyance made, and every
obligation incurred, by a person which is, or will be thereby
rendered, insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors, without
- 13 -

regard to his actual intent, if the conveyance is made or the
obligation is incurred without a fair consideration."
In the Supreme Court case of Meyer v. General American
Corp..

569 P.2nd 1094, (Utah 1977), Mr. Justice Ellett in

construing this statute stated the three essential elements that
must be proved:
"Both the statute and case law interpreting the statute
make it clear that subjective or actual intent to defraud are
not elements of a fraudulent conveyance claim. Meyer is
obligated to show only (1) that she was a creditor of GAC; (2)
that GAC was insolvent at the time the conveyance was made to
Terra; and (3) that the conveyance was not given for a fair
consideration."
In the present case, all three of these elements are
clearly evident. That Walker is a creditor of the Cavanaughs was
proven before a jury and is shown by the judgment entered in the
Third District Court in the sum of $779,537.74 in Walkers favor.
(R-372).

That

Cavanaughs

were

rendered

insolvent

by

the

conveyance is clear from the fact that Cavanaughs transferred
all their assets into the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust, supported
their lifestyle on the basis of the trust assets, and filed
bankruptcy due to insolvency as a result of Walker's large
judgment. (R-408 and Addendum A page 2). That the conveyance was
not given for a fair consideration is clear from the findings of
fact stated by Judge Rokich wherein he says, "No consideration
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was given to Mrs. Cavanaugh for the transfer of the Trust assets
into the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust. (Addendum A page 2)
Appellant Gordon D. Walker, contends that the argument set
forth in this POINT I is sufficient in and of itself to reverse
the ruling of the lower Court and enable Walker to now collect
from

the

bankruptcy

Trustee

the

proceeds

of

the

sale

of

Cavanaughs real property.

POINT II.

THE FACTS ARE SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT

CAVANAUGHS HAD ACTUAL INTENT TO DEFRAUD THEIR CREDITOR AND THE
VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUST SHOULD BE DECLARED VOID AS AGAINST ALL
ASSETS PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 25-1-7 (1953) AS AMENDED.
Section 25-1-7 Utah Code-Annotated (1953) states:
"Conveyance to hinder, delay, defraud
creditors. Every
conveyance made, and every obligation incurred, with actual
intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder,
delay or defraud either present or future creditors is
fraudulent as to both present and future creditors."
The Supreme Court case of Dahnken. Inc. Of Salt Lake vs.
Wilmarth, 726 P.2nd 420 (Utah 1986), dealt with the transfer of
real property by a son to his stepfather to avoid imminent
creditors. When examining the issue of actual intent in the
context

of

the

above

quoted

statute, this

court held

the

following:
to

hold

a

"Although actual fraudulent intent must be shown
conveyance fraudulent pursuant to 25-1-7, its
- 15 -

existence may be inferred from the presence of certain indicia
of fraud or "Badges of fraud." [Citing Given v. Lambeth, 10 Utah
2nd 287, 291, 351 P. 2nd 959, 962 (I960).] Badges of fraud that
pertain to this case are a debtor's (1) continuing in possession
and evidencing the perquisites of property ownership after
having formally conveyed all his interest in the property, (2)
making a conveyance in anticipation of litigation, and (3)
making a conveyance to a family member without receiving fair
consideration."
Dahnken, at 726 P.2nd at 423.
All of these "Badges of Fraud" exist in the present case as
well.

With

respect

to

subpart

(1) from

the

above quote,

property ownership prerequisites, Judge Rokich's findings of
fact

(page

Cavanaughs

2 of

addendum A) make

continued

in

possession

it very
after

clear that the
the

conveyance.

Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Judge Rokich's Memorandum Decision
state as follows:
"2. The Trust property of the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust
has been treated no differently after the transfer into the
Trust than it was before.
3. Mrs. Cavanaugh retains full control over the Trust
property, including the right to modify, amend or revoke the
Trust at any time.
4. Mrs. Cavanaugh has the full and complete enjoyment and
benefit of the Trust property' for the duration of her life."
Clearly

Mr. and Mrs. Cavanaugh continued to enjoy all the

benefits of the trust property after it was conveyed.
With respect to subpart (2) of the above Dahnken quote,
making a conveyance in anticipation of litigation, consider the
uncontested and undeniable fact that on April 10, 1986 Walker
- 16 -

filed

his

action

against

Cavanaughs

and

on

the

same day,

Cavanaughs transferred their California real property into the
Trust.

(R-452).

Walker's

claim,

and

ultimate

verdict

of

$836,446.97, was easily forecasted by Cavanaughs because they
had signed a $422,000 promissory note with Walker that was long
overdue and payment thereon was being demanded.
With regard to subpart (3), conveyance to a family member
without
Rokich's

receiving

fair

consideration,

again

finding of fact in his memorandum

look

at

Judge

decision, which

states, "No consideration was given to Mrs. Cavanaugh for the
transfer
Trust."

of the Trust assets

into the Violet P.

There was no consideration

Cavanaugh

for this transfer and

defendant debtor Violet P. Cavanaugh is the same Violet P.
Cavanaugh in whose name the Trust was created. (Addendum A)
As in Dahnken, we have here the obvious badges of fraud in
that there was continued beneficial enjoyment of the property,
anticipated litigation and no consideration. On the basis of
Dahnken alone, this Court has the precedent to void the Trust as
to the lawful and legitimate judgment lien of Mr. Walker.
The

Uniform

Fraudulent

Transfer

Act,

passed

by

the

legislature in 1988, codifies these badges of fraud in U. C. A.
25-6-5 (2). A copy of U. C. A. 25-6-5 (2) is attached hereto as
addendum D. Appellant contends that the legislature, by adopting
- 17 -

this

uniform

act,

has

validated

the

law

of

Dahnken

and

reinforced the fairness of not allowing fraudulent conveyances
to avoid creditors.
There is another indication of fraudulent intent by the
Cavanaughs in this case. On June 12, 1987, just several weeks
after trial completion, Cavanaughs recorded eight Trust Deeds on
the apartment property with insiders named as beneficiaries.
These

Trust

Deeds

total

more

than

$220,000

in

debt

and

effectively shield the property equity unless the Violet P.
Cavanaugh Trust is declared void. (Addendum C page 7 and 8).
These junior lien holders and insiders to the Cavanaughs, with
Trust Deeds on the property recorded after Walker's judgment,
will be given a priority to the cash proceeds of the sale of the
apartment unless Judge Rokich's ruling is reversed. Appellant
Walker respectfully asks this Court to apply the law of U.C.A.
25-1-7 and Dahnken to stop Cavanaugh7s fraudulent conveyance
scheme.
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POINT III.

THE BASIS UPON WHICH THE DISTRICT COURT DID

UPHOLD THE CAVANAUGH TRUST AS AGAINST THE WALKER JUDGMENT IS
ERRONEOUS AND LEACH vs. ANDERSON SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE
REAL PROPERTY.

The

District

Court

held

that

the

personal

property

transferred into the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust was subject to
execution.

However, on the basis of GEARY vs. CAIN, 9 P.jid 396

(Utah 1932), the District Court held that the real property
transferred into this Trust could not be executed upon. Judge
Rokich in his Memorandum Decision specifically stated; "If it
were not for the Geary case the court would be inclined to
invalidate the trust as to the real property also."

(Addendum

A, bottom of page 4)
However, the Geary case is easily distinguished from the
present case and can not be* considered as controlling law in
this case. Mrs. Geary had a judgment against Mr. Cain and sought
to execute against real property transferred into a corporation
in which Mr. Cain had a share of stock. The name of the
corporation was the Doris Trust Company.

A simple reading of

Geary clearly reveals that the transfers of real property were
not into a trust in the name of the debtor, but consisted of an
bona fide conveyance to a separate legal entity, ie:
- 19 -

The Doris

Trust Company.

The Supreme Court in Geary noted that the Doris

Trust Company was legitimate, not the alter ego of the debtor,
and that the transfers of real property had taken place at least
four years before the creditor's claim arose against the debtor.
After examining these conveyances, the Supreme Court stated in
Geary as follows; "These are all outright conveyances of title,
without limitations, reservations, or restrictions of any kind
material to the present inquiry."

(9 P..2d at 397).

Thus in Geary, and unlike the present case, the transfer of
the real property was a legitimate conveyance to a separate
corporation and had nothing to do with a revocable trust set up
solely for the benefit of the grantor debtors.

The Supreme

Court in Geary refused to allow Mrs. Geary to execute on the
real property because the grantee thereof was neither the alter
ego, agent, nor trustee of the grantor debtor. The facts and
legal conclusions of the Geary case

are dissimilar

in all

material respects to the present case.
In the present case, in concluding that the Violet P.
Cavanaugh Trust was valid as against Walker's judgment, the
District Court apparently relied upon the following language of
the

Geary

fraudulent

case;

"Section

transfer] relates

5816
only

property, not real property,
- 20 -

"

[former
to

U.C.A.

transfers

(9 P..2d at

57-1-11,

of personal
399).

This

statement by the court in Geary is obviously obiter dictum and
had no real application to the Geary facts. The thrust of the
Geary case was whether the Doris Trust Company was the alter ego
of the judgment debtor. The Supreme Court concluded that it was
not and protected the validity of the distinct corporate entity.
It is the more recent case of Leach vs. Anderson. 535
P.2d 1241 (Utah 1975), that examines U.C.A. 25-1-11 (1953) as
amended, and the validity of conveyances made into a trust when
the interests of creditors are concerned.

Section 25-1-11 reads

as follows:
"Trust for Grantor void. All deeds, gifts, conveyances,
transfers or assignments verbal or written, of goods, chattel,
or things in action made in trust for the use of the person
making the same shall be void as against the existing or
subsequent creditors of such person."
The Supreme Court in Leach ruled that the Trust created by
Mrs. Anderson was invalid as against the judgment of Mr. Leach
because it had been created for her use and benefit and could
not be used to prevent the judgment creditor from recovering the
obligation owing.

However, in Leach, there were sufficient

personal property assets to satisfy the judgment and therefore
the Court did not address the issue as to whether the real
property was also subject to plaintiff's judgment.

The Supreme

Court in Leach specifically opens the door against Geary by
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recognizing the common law and questioning that section 25-1-11
applies also to real property transfers:
"Defendants also make the argument that the statute under
scrutiny covers only personal property and therefore could not
affect the part of the trust that consists of real property. The
statute is but a codification of the common law, which for
reasons discussed herein, refused to give recognition to trusts
of this character involving any kind of property. However, the
evidence here is that there is very substantial personal
property, including stock in the Anderson Enterprises, valued at
$145,000. Accordingly, no useful purpose would be served by our
being concerned as to whether the real property may be subjected
to plaintiff's judgment." (535 P. 2nd at 1244, emphasis added).
Footnote

5

to

the

above

Leach

quote

provides

ample

authority for the position that a trust for the benefit of the
grantor is uniformly held entirely invalid as to any kind of
property and creditors can reach the trust property. Appellant
herein contends that the stated obiter dictum of Geary, relied
upon by the lower Court in this case, is a clear aberration to
the prevailing rule. The common law majority position should be
followed

in

the

present

case

for

the

obvious

reason

of

protecting Walker's legitimate judgment against the fraudulent
conveyance of Cavanaughs.
Unlike the Leach case, the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust does
not contain sufficient personal property to satisfy the judgment
of Walker. Judge Rokich in his Memorandum Decision stated the
following in this regard;
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"It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court in the Leach case
did not address the issue of real property being subject to
execution if conveyed to a trust such as the Violet P. Cavanaugh
Trust. Justice Ellett, author of the majority opinion, stated
that inasmuch as there was ample personal property assets to
satisfy the judgment it would not be necessary to address the
real property issue." (Addendum A, at page 4)
The real property issue in the Cavanaugh Trust must now be
addressed because it is the only remaining source sufficient to
pay the Walker judgment. Section 25-1-11 of U.C.A., with its
reference to "deeds," and the case law of Leach, provides now a
third legal basis upon which the decision of the lower court can
and should be reversed to include real property. Accordingly,
appellant respectfully requests that this Supreme Court follow
the common law, expand Leach to include real property, and
distinguish Geary as argued herein.

For another important reason this Court can expand Leach to
include real property pursuant to U.C.A. 25-1-11.
passing of Utah
Fraudulent

Code Annotated

Transfer

25-6

With the

et. seq. , The Uniform

Act, former U.C.A.

section

25-1-11 was

repealed. Section 25-1-11 will be subject to review on a less
frequent basis and quickly die altogether. In other words, the
Geary case ruling on language identical to 25-1-11 is now moot
because the language of 25-1-11 has been repealed. Future cases
dealing with this issue will be construed pursuant to the new
- 23 -

statute.

The changing of the law in this area has already been

done by the legislative session of 1988. The Supreme Court is
only being asked to focus on the legitimate claim of a single
creditor.

This Cavanaugh v. Walker case becomes a one time only

precedent.

POINT IV.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 25-1-6 (1953) AS AMENDED

PROVIDES ANOTHER STATUTORY BASIS TO VOID THE CAVANAUGH TRUST
WITH

RESPECT

TO

THE REAL PROPERTY

CASH

PROCEEDS

CONTAINED

THEREIN.
Section 25-1-6 U.C.A. 1953 provides the following;
"Conveyances by persons about to incur debts. Every conveyance
made and every obligation incurred, without fair consideration,
when the person making the conveyance or entering into the
obligation intends to, or believes that he will, incur debts
beyond his ability to pay as they mature, is fraudulent as to
both present and future creditors."
In this case, Cavanaughs knew that a promissory note for
$422,000 was due and owing with interest. The debt was incurred
and about to be reduced to judgment. There was no consideration,
as

has

been

previously

discussed,

and

this

obligation

by

Cavanaugh to Walker was beyond Cavanaughs ability to pay absent
the trust assets. Thus this section of the code provides yet
another basis to hold for Walker and invalidate the Cavanaugh
Trust.
- 24 -

All four sections of the Utah Code set forth so far in this
brief can and should be construed to apply to the facts of this
case. On the basis of one or all of these sections, the lower
Court should be reversed.

POINT V.

PUBLIC POLICY PROHIBITS AN OWNER OF REAL OR

PERSONAL PROPERTY FROM PLACING THAT PROPERTY BEYOND THE REACH
OF HIS CREDITORS WHILE HE CONTINUES TO BENEFIT AND ENJOY IT.

Appellant contends that the judgment debtors should not be
allowed to hide their assets behind a revocable grantor trust,
set up for their benefit and use, to the detriment of their
legitimate judgment creditors. There are no valid public policy
arguments that would allow a party in litigation to transfer his
real property into a trust, for his benefit and use, and thereby
prevent an execution thereon by a creditor.

Public policy

demands that such transfers into trust be held void as to lawful
creditors.

In LEACH, the Utah Supreme Court stated with regard

to section 25-1-11 U.C.A. 1953:
"The intent and the effect of the statute is to prevent a
person from using a trust as a device by which he can retain for
himself and enjoy substantially all of the advantages of
ownership and at the same time place it beyond the legitimate
claims of his creditors." (535 P..2d at 1243)
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Indeed, nothing would be more abhorrent and frustrating to
the judicial system than preventing recovery of judgments by
simply allowing debtors to transfer their real estate into a
trust pending litigation. The law is clear and public policy is
firmly opposed to the possibility of the beneficial owner of
property placing that property beyond the reach of his creditors
while continuing to enjoy it.
The general rule is stated at 37 Am Jur 2d, page 720;
"The recognized
indicia or badges of fraud concerning
conveyances attacked as fraudulent as to creditors include any
reservation of benefit to the transferor or his family. One may
not be the beneficial owner of property and still have it exempt
from his debts. Indeed, it has been said that no effort of a
debtor to hinder or delay his creditors is more severely
condemned by law than an attempt to place his property where he
can enioy it and at the same time require his creditors to await
his pleasure for the payment of their claims out of it.
Subsequent, as well as existing, creditors may have such a
transaction declared fraudulent." (Section 27, emphasis added).
"Basically, it is recognized that an individual cannot
create out of his own property for his own benefit a trust for
himself and thereby defeat his creditors of their lawful
demands."
(Section 28, emphasis added).
Numerous cases and other legal authorities have phrased
this basic law in articulate terms. In

Nelson

v. California

Trust Co. . 33 Cal.2d 501, 202 P.2d 1021 (1949), the judgment
creditor sought to reach the assets of a trust created by his
judgment debtor.

The California court held that all of the
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trust property was subject to the claim of the creditor, and
said;
"It is against public policy to permit a man to tie up his
property in such a way that he can enjoy it but prevent his
creditors from reaching it, and where the settlor mcikes himself
a beneficiary of a trust any restraints in the instrument on the
involuntary alienation of . his interest are invalid and
ineffective. [citations omitted]. Since Bixby was the sole
beneficiary, all the property in the trust is subject to the
claims of his creditors." ((202 P.2nd at 1021, emphasis added).
Cited with approval in the Nelson case is McColcran v.Walter
Maaee.

Inc..

172

Cal. 182, 155

P.

995

(1916), where

the

California court held that a spendthrift trust attempted to be
created in the settlor's own favor is invalid, even though he
had no fraudulent intent toward his creditors.
uniform

The cases are

in holding that quite apart from statute, a person

cannot create a spendthrift trust for himself which shall be
effective against the rights of his subsequent creditors. (See
44 Harvard Law Review 205

Erwin Griswold). Furthermore, as

shown in the above quote, there is no distinction between real
and

personal

property

for

purposes

of

this

case.

In

the

commercial marketplace real property equity is used as a cash
medium every bit as much as personal property.

The Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust in this case contains the
following spendthrift clause;
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ARTICLE X
SPENDTHRIFT PROVISION
"The interests of each beneficiary in income and principal
shall be free from the control or interference of any creditor
of such beneficiary, or the spouse of a married beneficiary, or
the parent of the child beneficiary, and shall not be subject to
attachment or be subject to assignment." (R-410).
In light of this spendthrift clause and Judge Rokich's
findings of fact that Violet Cavanaugh is the beneficiary and
sole trustee of the Trust with full control over it, (R-389),
consider these additional authorities cited with approval by the
Utah Supreme Court in Leach:
"Even in jurisdictions in which spendthrift trusts
permitted, the settler cannot create a spendthrift trust for
own benefit. It is immaterial that in creating the trust
settler did not intend to defraud his creditors.
It
immaterial that he was solvent at the time of creation of
trust." Scott on trusts, Vol.11, Sec.156, p.1092.

are
his
the
is
the

"If a settlor creates a trust for his own benefit and
inserts a spendthrift clause, it is void as far as then existing
or future creditors are concerned, and they can reach his
interest under the trust."
Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, (2d
Ed.), Sec.223, at p.438.
"A man cannot put his own property beyond the reach of
creditors and at the same time reserve substantial interests in
it or control over it." Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts, page 543.
The following two quotes, dated 1862 and 1898 respectively,
well characterize the negative impact of allowing a debtor to
conceal his assets from just creditors by use of a trust.
"It would revolutionize the credit system entirely, destroy
all faith in the apparent ownership of property, and repeal all
our statutes and decisions against frauds. Every man about to
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engage in business where there was a chance of loss, would place
himself under the pupilage of trustees, and everybody's estates
would be passing under settlement deeds and trustees' accounts
through the courts, before, in the natural course of things, the
jurisdiction of the Orphans7 Court would attach."
Mackason's
Appeal. 42 Pa. 330 at 338, (1862)
"It would be a startling and revolutionary doctrine to hold
that this reserved interest cannot be reached by the plaintiff
as a creditor. If such is the law it would make it possible for
a person free from debt to place his property beyond the reach
of creditors, and secure to himself a comfortable support during
life, without regard to his subsequent business ventures,
contracts or losses." Schenck v. Barnes. 50 N.E. 967, N.Y. 316,
321, 41 L.R.A. 395, ^^
The above general statements of the law and public policy
are followed in many cases set out in the notes to 119 ALR 35
and 34 ALR 2d 1342.

The cases cited uniformly hold that the

grantor cannot avoid or hinder his own creditors by such a
provision as is in the Cavanaugh Trust. The very creation of the
Cavanaugh Trust with it's spendthrift provision, made at the
commencing of this litigation, evidences a scheme with a clear
purpose of placing property beyond the reach of creditors.
Appellant

Walker

was

the

imminent

creditor,

his

$422,000

promissory note was long past due. In the Cavanaugh Trust the
spendthrift

provision

is

expressly

for

the

protection

and

insulation of the grantors who thereafter became indebted to
Walker. By the terms of the trust, all of the assets can be used
and have been used for the benefit of the grantors and the
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entire

trust

should

now

be

declared

void

as

against this

creditor of the grantors.
Another

on

point

statement

of

the

controlling

rule

applicable to this case is set forth in the Restatement of
Trusts Second, Section 156, p. 326, as follows;
"156 WHERE THE SETTLOR IS A BENEFICIARY
(1) Where a person creates for his own benefit a trust with a
provision restraining the voluntary or involuntary transfer of
his interest, his transferee or creditors can reach his
interests.
(2) Where a person creates for his own benefit a trust for
support or a discretionary trust, his transferee or creditors
can reach the maximum amount which the trustee under the terms
of the trust could pay to him or apply for his benefit."
The Comment following this restatement of the law is also
relevant;
" a. Intention to defraud creditors not required. The rules
stated in this Section are applicable although the transfer is
not a fraudulent conveyance. The interest of the settlorbeneficiary can be reached by subsequent creditors as well as by
those who were creditors at the time of the creation of the
trust, and it is immaterial that the settlor-beneficiary had no
intention to defraud his creditors."
The numerous quotes in this POINT V tie back as well to the
arguments

set

forth

in

POINTS

I,

II,

III

and

IV.

These

statements of law are grouped here to emphasize the strong
public policy which prohibits transfers to trusts to avoid
creditors.

In his Memorandum Decision, Judge Rokich made the

following conclusions; "There is no question that the Violet P.
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Cavanaugh Trust was created for her own use and benefit and to
the detriment of her creditors, (R-390).

If it were not for the

Geary case the court would be inclined to invalidate the trust
as to the real property also." (R-391).

In other words, the

District court recognized the injustice of these transfers into
trust, but felt legally bound by Geary to uphold the trust as to
the real property.

Appellant again respectfully requests that

this Court follow the sound reasoning of the uniformly held
position by declaring the Viplet P. Cavanaugh trust void as to
real property as well as personal property.

POINT VI.

THERE IS NO RATIONAL BASIS TO DISTINGUISH REAL FROM

PERSONAL PROPERTY IN THIS CASE AND THE VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUST
SHOULD BE DECLARED VOID AS TO BOTH TYPES OF PROPERTY.

On April 25, 1988, six weeks after Judge Rokich's ruling in
this case, Utah adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, now
codified in U.C.A. Section 25 Chapter 6.

Appellant argues that

the enactment of this uniform statute provides a strong reason
for The Supreme Court to reverse the lower Court and hold in
this case that the real property of Cavanaughs can not be
conveyed to trust free of the judgment of Walker- The Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act makes no distinction between real and
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personal

property, or property

in

trust

as opposed

to an

outright conveyance. This Fraudulent Transfer Act simply defines
property as anything that may be the subject of ownership.
Appellants

urge

The

Supreme

artificial

distinction

Court

between

real

to

also

and

eliminate

personal

this

property

conveyances to avoid creditors.
That the distinction between real and personal property is
artificial is evident by the fact that Cavanaugh's Bankruptcy
Trustee, Mr. Dennis McGoldrick, sold the Cavanaugh real property
on November 2, 1988 and took possession of the cash proceeds.
Those proceeds are being held

pending the outcome of this

appeal. The real property was thus easily and quickly reduced to
cash by a sale. There simply is no basis to justify voiding the
Cavanaugh Trust as to personal property, but not real property.
The United States Bankruptcy, law enabled the Trustee to revoke
the Cavanaugh Trust entirely, without regard to the different
types

of

property

contained

therein.

Appellant

fails

to

understand any logical basis upon which the bankruptcy trustee
can immediately reach all assets of the trust, while the prior
judgment creditor, appellant herein, can only reach the personal
property assets which are insufficient to satisfy his judgment.
None of the authorities cited in POINT V make a distinction
between real and personal property. Real property in todays
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economy is for all practical purposes every bit as liquid as
personal

property.

To

disallow

Walker

from

recovering

judgment on the basis of this mock distinction

his

is totally

unjustified.

CONCLUSION
This case presently consists of an obvious injustice upon
the appellant. For the sole reason that Mr. and Mrs. Cavanaugh
had their equity in real estate, as opposed to personalty, Mr.
Walker is unable to satisfy his judgment. That judgment came
after a jury trial and the substance of the trial is not being
contested. Each and every one of the four Fraudulent Conveyance
Statutes provides a basis to invalidate the Violet P. Cavanaugh
Trust and allow Mr. Walker to satisfy his judgment from the real
property assets contained therein. Strong public policy condemns
this kind of conveyance transaction. The real property has been
reduced to cash and is being held by the bankruptcy Trustee,
pending a decision by this court. In substance therefore, there
is no difference between real* and personal property.
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Appellant

respectfully

seeks

an Order

from

this Court

reversing the Final Order of the lower Court, (Addendum C) and
declaring the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust void as to both the
personal property

and the real property cash proceeds. The

judgment lien of Walker would then have attached to the real
property of Cavanaugh upon entry of judgment and justly enable
him to now satisfy his judgment.

Dated this O * ^ ^> day of June

Lchard K. Nebeker
Attorney for Appellant
Gordon D. Walker

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that T ct true and correct copy5 of the
appellant's

brief

was

hand

delivered

to

the

office

of

Respondent's counsel, Douglas J. Payne, at 215 South State
Street, suite 1200, this

1 ^ day of July 1991.
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ADDENDUM *

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOHN A, CAVANAUGH and
VIOLET CAVANAUGH,

:

Plaintiffs,
:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CIVIL NO. C 85-1499

VS.
GORDON D. WALKER and COVECREST
PROPERTIES, a Utah Limited
Partnership,
Defendants and
Counter-Claimants for
Foreclosure.
Defendants1

:
:

Motion and Order

in Supplemental

came on for hearing on the 13th day of November.
represented by Colin R. Winchester.
by Richard R. Nebeker.

Proceedings

Plaintiffs were

Defendants were represented

The court heard testimony, received a

copy of the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust and granted counsel an
opportunity to submit memoranda.

The court took the matter under

advisement pending the receipt of the memoranda.

The court

orally advised counsel of its decision and stated that a written
memorandum decision would be mailed to counsel.
The issue presented to the court is whether the property
transferred by John Arthur Cavanaugh and Violet P. Cavanaugh into
the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust pending this litigation is now
subject to lawful execution by the judgment creditor.

CAVANAUGH V WALKER, ET AL

PAGE TWO

In order to arrive at a decision

MEMORANDUM DECISION

in this case it was

essential to ascertain what the facts are in order to determine
the validity of the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust.
The court found the facts to be as follows:
1.

No consideration was given to Mrs. Cavanaugh for the

transfer of the Trust assets into the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust.
2.

The Trust property of the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust has

been treated no differently after the transfer into the Trust
than it was before.
3.

Mrs. Cavanaugh

retains

full control over the trust

property, including the right to modify, amend or revoke the
Trust at any time.
4.

Mrs. Cavanaugh has the full and complete enjoyment and

benefit of the Trust property for the duration of her life.
5.

Mrs. Cavanaugh may transfer the Trust property at any

time for any purpose.
6.

Mrs. Cavanaugh is the beneficiary of all Trust property

and proceeds.
7.

The alleged sole purpose for the Trust was to provide

for tax benefits.
8.

At present, Violet P. Cavanaugh is the sole Trustee and

will remain so for the duration of her life.
9.
hereto,

A

true

and

representation.

and

the

correct

Trust

copy

itself

of the Trust
substantiates

is attached
the

above

CAVANAUGH V. WALKER, ET AL

PAGE THREE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

ARGUMENT
Section 25-1-11 U.C.A.

(1953) as amended

is directly in

point and provides as follows:
25-1-11
conveyances,

Trust

for

transfers

Grantor

or

void.

assignments

All
verbal

deeds,

gifts,

or written, of

goods, chattel, or things in action made in trust for the use of
the person making the same shall be void as against the existing
or subsequent creditors of such person.
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Leach v. Anderson, 525
P2d 1241 (1975) interpreted Section 25-1-11 and the applicability
to a case with similar facts in this case.
The Supreme Court in the Leach v. Anderson case ruled that
the trust created in the Leach case was invalidated.
In comparing the facts in this case to the facts in the
Leach case the court concludes that the law set forth in the
Leach case is applicable.
There is no question that the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust was
created for her own use and benefit and to the detriment of her
creditors.
The court concludes that the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust is
declared
trust.
is

not

invalid as to the personal property conveyed to the
The invalidation of the trust as to the personal property
to

be

interpreted

to

mean

that

the

defendants

precluded from executing on other assets of the plaintiffs.

are

CAVANAUGH V WALKER, ET AL

PAGE FOUR

MEMORANDUM DECISION

It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court in the Leach case
did not address the issue of real property being subject to
execution if conveyed to a trust such as the Violet P. Cavanaugh
Trust,

Justice Ellett, author of the majority opinion, stated

that inasmuch as there was ample personal property assets to
satisfy the judgment it would not be necessary to address the
real property issue.
Since the Leach case did not address the issue of whether
real property would be subject to defendants1 judgment; the court
referred to Geary v. Cain 9 P2d 396 1932 cited by plaintiffs.
The Geary case interpreted Section 5816 which is identical to
Section 25-1-11 and stated as follows:

Section 5816 relates only

to transfers of personal property, not real property, and hence
has no application to the conveyance of the real estate here
involved.

It relates only to "goods, chattels or things in

action", which in any sense of the terms are not real property.
The statute has remained unchanged and the Geary decision
has not been overruled.
If it were not

for the Geary case

the court would be

inclined to invalidate the trust as to the real property also.

Dated February 16, 1988.

JUDGE JOHN A, ROKICH
Copies mailed to counsel.
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CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
Richard K. Nebeker (A2370)
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300
Attorney for Gordon D. Walker
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

JOHN A. CAVANAUGH and
VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH,
ORDER PARTIALLY INVALIDATING
THE VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUST

Plaintiffs,
vs .
GORDON D. WALKER and COVECREST
PROPERTIES, a Utah Limited
Partnership,
Defendants and
Counter-Claimants for
Foreclosure.

Civil No. C85-1499

* * * * * * *

Defendant and counter-claimant, Gordon D. Walker's Motion
and Order in Supplemental Proceedings came on for Hearing on
the 13th day of November, 1987.
Colin R. Winchester.
Nebeker.

Plaintiffs were represented by

Defendants were represented by Richard K.

The Court heard testimony, received a copy of the

Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust and granted counsel an opportunity to
submit memoranda.

The Court took the matter under advisement

pending the receipt of the memoranda.

The issue presented to the Court was whether the property
transferred by John Arthur Cavanaugh and Violet P. Cavanaugh
into the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust pending this litigation is
now subject to lawful execution by the judgment creditor.

Legal memoranda was submitted by the parties, and based
upon the testimony given, the records and files of the Court,
I

and said legal memoranda, the Court issued its Memorandum

|

Decision, (a copy of which is attached hereto).

j

and in accordance with said Memorandum Decision, it is hereby;

Now therefore,

i

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT;

j

The Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust is invalid as to all of the

I personal property, conveyed to the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust
including but not limited to all accounts receivable, notes
payable, rents collectible, securities, goods, chattels,
accounts, personalty and things in action held within said
Trust.

Accordingly, any and all such personal property may now

be legally and lawfully executed upon by
defendants/counter-claimiants Gordon D. Walker and Covecrest
Properties.
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On the basis of Geary v Cain 9 P2d 396 (1932) the Violet P.
Cavanaugh Trust is hereby declared valid with respect to the
real property held in the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust and
defendants/counter-claimants are precluded from foreclosing
said real property.

Neither this Order nor the Courts Memorandum Decision shall
preclude defendants/counter-claimants from executing on the
personal property assets of the plaintiffs including real
estate held outside of the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust.

Approved:

V-

f]J^cL )s "
iichard K. Nebeker
Attorney for Defendant Counter-Claimant

Dated

Mard \5, tttf(

Corift "R. Winchester
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Dated t h i s

Z£

Dated

day of March, 1988

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) M
«. THE UNDERSIGNED. CLERK OF THE DISTHlCi
CCU*T OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH. OGHEREBr
CCTTvTV THAI THE ANNEXED ANO FOftEGtMNQ !S
A r.iu£ ANO FULL COPY OF AN ORIGINAL DfcCU1/ * VT ON RLE IN MY OFFICEtA£ SUCH CLERK. \

/?

By_

John A. Rokich

TUFRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
A ATTEST i

BY

T"U I

&

DEPUTY

CDN3498N

3Y

-

3 -

Hep?, f

r.

rOOSMDUM H

Dennis E. McGoldrick #97720

1 McGoldrick & McGoldrick

18726 Western Avenue, Suite 208
90248-3829

2 Gardena, California
(213) 327-7212
3
4

5 Attorneys for Trustee
6
7
8

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

9

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Bky. No. LA88-12763-CA

10 In re:

Chapter 7

JOHN ARTHUR CAVANAUGH

11 VIOLET PHYLLIS CAVANAUGH

STIPULATION TO ALLOW
TRUSTEE TO SELL REAL
PROPERTY FREE AND CLEAR OF
LIENS AND INTERESTS [11 U.S.C.
§ 363(f)]; ORDER THEREON

12
13
14
15
Debtors.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Date: (NO HEARING NECESSARY)
Time:
Courtroom: "8529", 8th Floor

Dennis E. McGoldrick, trustee, Gordon D. Walker and Covecrest
Properties, a Utah Limited Partnership, enter into the following
stipulation based upon the following facts:
1.

Dennis E. McGoldrick is the duly appointed and acting

trustee of the estate in this Chapter 7 proceeding.
2.

The Bankruptcy Estate includes property commonly

23 [described as 130 and 136 East Avenue 42, Los Angeles, California
24 |and more particularly described as:
LOTS 7 AND 8 IN BLOCK 5 OF G. W. MORGAN'S SYCAMORE

25
26

GROVE TRACT, IN THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES, IN THE COUNTY

27

OF LOS ANGELES, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AS PER MAP RECORDED

28

IN BOOK 11 PAGES 57 AND 58 OF MISCELLANEOUS RECORD, IN
b:\t\stip

1.12.89

narro i

1

THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER OF SAID COUNTY,

2

(hereafter "the property")

3

3.

The trustee desires to sell the property free and clear

4 of all interests.
4.

5

The trustee filed an application to sell said property

6 free and clear of all interests, but counsel for the trustee
7 neglected to give notice of said application to Gordon D. Walker
8 and Covecrest Properties (hereafter "Walker and Covecrest").

Said

9 application was approved and an order was entered allowing the
10 sale of the property free and clear of all liens on November 2,
11 1988.
12

The trustee now desires to clear the problem created by

lack of notice ot Walker and Covecrest.
5.

13

Walker and Covecrest, creditors of this estate, wish to

14 see the assets of this estate liquidated so that creditors of this
15 estate may be paid.
6.

16

Walker and Covecrest have different types of claims of

17 lien on the property, including a notice of pendency of action
18 recorded as instrument 87-825004 on May 26, 1987, a notice of
19 pendency of action recorded as instrument 87-1448447 on September
20 9, 1987, and an abstract of judgment recorded as 88-80842 on
21 January 20, 1988. The title report attached as Exhibit "A", and
22 incorporated herein by this reference, lists these items a items
23 7, 16 and 17.
7.

24
25
26
27

When the abstract of judgment was filed, title to the

property was not in the Cavanaugh's name.

Titl*=> to the property

jwas in the Violet Cavanaugh Trust until the trust was revoked oy
Dennis E. McGoldrick in his capacity as bankruptcy trustee.

28 I///

1

NOW THEREFORE, the parties stipulate:

2

1.

The trustee, Dennis E. McGoldrick, may sell the property

3 free and clear of all of the Walker and Covecrest liens (including
4 items 7, 16 and 17 on said title report).
5

2.

The liens, to the extent they now encumber the property,

6! shall encumber the proceeds of the sale of said property.
7

SO STIPULATED:

8 Dated: January 12, 1989

~sDennis E. McGoldrick, Trustee

9
10

Dated: January

./ 1989

11

Gordon D. Walker

12

Covecrest Properties, a Utah
Limited Partnership

13
14 Dated: January

1989

%

By:

-

General Partner

15
16

Callister, Duncan & Nebeker
Attorneys for Walker and Covecrest

17
18

-S -

By:

19

Richard K. Nebeker

20
ORDER

21
22

IT IS SO ORDERED.

23
24

Dated: January

, 1989

BY THE COURT

25
26
27
28 c:\t\stip 1.12.89

-.s CALVIN K. ASHLAND
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
page 3

TICOR TITLE 1,DURANCE COMPANY OF CALIFORi.xA
240 ARTESIA BLVD., TORRANCE, CALIFORNIA

90504

TEL. (213) 542-0511

OCTOBER 25, 1988

BAY SHORE ESCROW
1026 MANHATTAN BEACH BLVD.
MANHATTAN BEACH, CALIFORNIA 90266
ENTION: TREVA
IR REFERENCE: 14281
: NO.
: 8544257
IN RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE REFERENCED APPLICATION FOR A POLICY OF
FLE INSURANCE, TICOR TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA HEREBY
>ORTS THAT IT IS PREPARED TO ISSUE, OR CAUSE TO BE ISSUED, AS OF THE
TE HEREOF, A POLICY OR POLICIES OF TITLE INSURANCE DESCRIBING THE LAND
) THE ESTATE OR INTEREST THEREIN HEREINAFTER SET FORTH, INSURING
UNST LOSS WHICH MAY BE SUSTAINED BY REASON OF ANY DEFECT, LIEN OR
:UMBRANCE NOT SHOWN OR REFERRED TO AS AN EXCEPTION BELOW OR NOT
:i_UDED FROM COVERAGE PURSUANT TO THE PRINTED SCHEDULES, CONDITIONS AND
IPULATIONS OF SAID POLICY FORMS.
THE PRINTED EXCEPTIONS AND EXCLUSIONS FROM THE COVERAGE OF SAID
LICY OR POLICIES ARE SET FORTH ON THE ATTACHED COVER. COPIES OF THE
LICY FORMS SHOULD BE READ. THEY ARE AVAILABLE FROM THE OFFICE WHICH
SUED THIS REPORT.
THIS REPORT (AND ANY SUPPLEMENTS OR AMENDMENTS THERETO) IS ISSUED
LELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF FACILITATING THE ISSUANCE OF A POLICY OF TITLE
SURANCE AND NO LIABILITY IS ASSUMED HEREBY. IF IT IS DESIRED THAT
ABILITY BE ASSUMED PRIOR TO THE ISSUANCE OF A POLICY OF TITLE
(SURANCE, A BINDER OR COMMITMENT SHOULD BE REQUESTED.
iTED AT 7:30 A.M. AS OF OCTOBER 17, 1988
[TLE OFFICER: D.MC CRADY
IE FORM OF POLICY OF TITLE INSURANCE CONTEMPLATED BY THIS REPORT IS:
_TA LOAN POLICY - 1970 WITH ALTA ENDORSEMENT FORM 1 COVERAGE
WENDED 10-17-70)
TITLE TO THE ESTATE OR INTEREST REFERRED TO HEREIN, AT THE DATE
EREOF, IS VESTED IN:
JOHN A. CAVANAUGH AND VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH,HUSBAND AND WIFE, AS JOINT
ENANTS

^noiHouM n rn-,r 4

TICOR TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA

THE ESTATE OR INTEREST IN THE LAND HEREINAFTER DESCRIBED OR REFERRED TO
COVERED BY THIS REPORT IS: A FEE.

VT THE DATE HEREOF EXCEPTIONS TO COVERAGE IN ADDITION TO THE PRINTED
IXCEPTIONS AND EXCLUSIONS CONTAINED IN SAID POLICY FORM WOULD BE AS
r
OLLOWS:
GENERAL AND SPECIAL COUNTY AND CITY TAXES
OR THE FISCAL YEAR 1988-1989, INCLUDING PERSONAL PROPERTY TAX, IF ANY,
OTAL AMOUNT
$1,806.24
IRST INSTALLMENT
$905.79
ECOND INSTALLMENT : $900.45
ODE AREA
4
ARCEL NO.
5467-2-7
SSESSED VALUATIONS FOR THE YEAR 1988-1989
AND
• $21,296.00
MPROVEMENTS
$136,675.00
XEMPTIONS
: NONE
ET
$158,491.00
THE LIEN OF SUPPLEMENTAL TAXES, IF ANY, ASSESSED PURSUANT TO THE
ROVISIONS OF CHAPTER 3.5 (COMMENCING WITH SECTION 75) OF THE REVENUE
W TAXATION CODE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA.
AN EASEMENT AFFECTING THE PORTION OF SAID LAND AND FOR THE
JRPOSES STATED HEREIN, AND INCIDENTAL PURPOSES,
i FAVOR OF
: CITY OF LOS ANGELES
10 REPRESENTATION IS MADE AS TO THE PRESENT OWNERSHIP OF SAID EASEMENT)
)R
CONDUCTING WATER
XORDED
IN BOOK 61 PAGE 208 OF DEEDS
FECTS
LOT 7
A DEED OF
ATED HEREIN
TED
OUNT
USTOR
USTEE
NEFICIARY
:ORDED
?TRUMENT NO,

TRUST TO SECURE AN INDEBTEDNESS IN THE ORIGINAL AMOUNT
MARCH 7, 1977
$136,500.00
BRUCE A. BRAUN, BRIAN GURNEE, ROBERT ACHESON AND JOHN
FITZPATRICK, EACH MARRIED MEN, AS THEIR SOLE AND SEPARATE
PROPERTY, AS TO AN UNDIVIDED 25 PER CENT INTEREST
SUPERIOR TITLE SERVICE, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION
UNION FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, A CORPORATION
MARCH 28, 1977
77-306194

AODBNDUM C PME 5

TICOR TITLE J...SURANCE COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA

AN ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS, AS ADDITIONAL SECURITY FOR THE PAYMENT OF
INDEBTEDNESS SECURED BY THE DEED OF TRUST INSURED HEREIN, WHICH
[GNMENT WAS
BRUCE A. BRAUN, BRIAN GURNEE, ROBERT ACHESON AND JOHN
:UTED BY
FITZPATRICK EACH MARRIED MEN, AS THEIR SOLE AND SEPARATE
PROPERTY, AS TO AN UNDIVIDED 25 PER CENT
UNION FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION
ORDED
MARCH 28, 1977 AS INSTRUMENT NO. 77-306195
INCLUDES
RENTAL
A DEED OF
TED HEREIN
ED
UNT
STOR
ISTEE
IEFICIARY
)ORDED
TRUMENT NO.

TRUST TO SECURE AN INDEBTEDNESS IN THE ORIGINAL AMOUNT
MAY 6, 1982
$241,000.00
JOHN CAVANAUGH AND VIOLET CAVANAUGH, HUSBAND AND WIFE
SAFECO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION
TACOMA SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, AN ASSOCIATION
JUNE 29, 1982
82-650956

INSTRUMENT SUBSTITUTES THE TRUSTEE IN SAID DEED OF TRUST
i TRUSTEE
T. D. SERVICE COMPANY
TED
SEPTEMBER 28, 1984
:ORDED
OCTOBER 2, 1984 AS INSTRUMENT NO. 84-1187525
1'ICE OF DEFAULT UNDER THE TERMS OF SAID DEED OF TRUST BY THE
LEGED OWNER AND HOLDER OF THE NOTE SECURED THEREBY
CORDED
: OCTOBER 2, 1984 AS INSTRUMENT NO. 84-1187526
ECUTED BY : AMERICAN SAVINGS BANK
AN ACTION IN
DICIAL DISTRICT:
MMENCED
TITLED
iSE NO.
iTURE OF ACTION
TECTS

THE MUNICIPAL COURT
LOS ANGELES
MAY 21, 1987
GORDON D. WALKER AND COVECREST PROPERTIES VS. JOHN A.
CAVANAUGH, VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH AND SNOWCAP PROPERTIES
87K21089, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
TO SET ASIDE THE TRANSFER OF THE REAL PROPERTY INTO THE
VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUST ON THE BASIS THAT SAID TRANSFER
WAS DONE TO AVOID POTENTIAL CREDITORS.
SAID LAND

)TICE OF THE PENDENCY OF SAID ACTION WAS
£CORDED: MAY 26, 1987 AS INSTRUMENT NO. 87-825004

ADDENDUM C P»\nE 6

TICOR TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA

A DEED OF
FATED HEREIN
*TED
10UNT
iUSTOR
<USTEE
:NEFICIARY
[CORDED
ISTRUMENT NO
A DEED OF
ATED HEREIN
TED
:
OUNT
:
USTOR
:
USTEE
:
NEFICIARY
:
CORDED
:
STRUMENT NO.:
A DEED OF
*TED HEREIN
TED
:
)UNT
:
JSTOR
:
ISTEE
:
IEFICIARY
:
IORDED
:
TRUMENT NO.:
A DEED OF
TED HEREIN
ED
:
UNT
:
STOR
:
STEE
:
EFICIARY
:
DRDED
:
TRUMENT NO.:

TRUST TO SECURE AN INDEBTEDNESS IN THE ORIGINAL AMOUNT
OCTOBER 5, 1981
$80,000.00
VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUST, VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUSTEE
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE
EDNA ZIMMER
JUNE 12, 1987
87-934483
TRUST TO SECURE AN INDEBTEDNESS IN THE ORIGINAL AMOUNT
APRIL 25, 1983
$30,000.00
VIOLET P. CANANAUGH TRUST, VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUSTEE DATED
MARCH 20, 1986
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE
EDNA ZIMMER
JUNE 12, 1987
87-934484
TRUST TO SECURE AN INDEBTEDNESS IN THE ORIGINAL AMOUNT
JUNE 30, 1983
$15,000.00
VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUST, VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH, TRUSTEE DATED
MARCH 20, 1986
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE
EDWARD ZIMMER
JUNE 12, 1987
87-934485
TRUST TO SECURE AN INDEBTEDNESS IN THE ORIGINAL AMOUNT
NOVEMBER 14, 1984
$36,995.00
VIOLET P. CANANAUGH TRUST, VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUSTEE DATED
MARCH 20, 1986
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE
EDNA ZIMMER
JUNE 12, 1987
87-934486

ADDENDUM C PAHE 7

TICOR TITLE ... DURANCE COMPANY OF

A DEED OF
iTED HEREIN
ED
IUNT
ISTOR
ISTEE
JEFICIARY
:ORDED
;TRUMENT NO.
A DEED OF
*TED HEREIN
TED
3UNT
JSTOR
JSTEE
NEFICIARY
CORDED
STRUMENT NO.
A DEED OF
ATED HEREIN
TED
lOUNT
USTOR
,'USTEE
:NEFICIARY
.CORDED
ISTRUMENT NO.
>.
A DEED OF
TATED HEREIN
*TED
:
10UNT
:
*USTOR
:
*USTEE
:
ENEFICIARY
:
ECORDED
:
MSTRUMENT NO.:

CALIFOK.MIA

TRUST TO SECURE AN INDEBTEDNESS IN THE ORIGINAL AMOUNT
APRIL 23, 1985
$14,095.00
VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUST, VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH, TRUSTEE DATED
MARCH 20, 1986
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE
EDWARD ZIMMER
JUNE 12, 1987
87-934487
TRUST TO SECURE AN INDEBTEDNESS IN THE ORIGINAL AMOUNT
MAY 6, 1983
$20,000.00
VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUST, VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH, TRUSTEE DATED
MARCH 20, 1986
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE
EDWARD ZIMMER
JUNE 12, 1987
87-934488
TRUST TO SECURE AN INDEBTEDNESS IN THE ORIGINAL AMOUNT
FEBRUARY 28, 1986
$10,800.00
VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUST, VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH, TRUSTEE DATED
MARCH 20, 1986
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE
EDWARD ZIMMER
JUNE 12, 1987
87-934489
TRUST TO SECURE AN INDEBTEDNESS IN THE ORIGINAL AMOUNT
MAY 15, 1984
$15,000.00
VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUST, VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH, TRUSTEE DATED
MARCH 20, 1986
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE
EDWARD ZIMMER
JUNE 12, 1987
87-934490

ADDENDUM C PK1E 3

TICOR TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA '-

6.
AN ACTION IN
IUDICIAL DISTRICT:
UMMENCED
NTITLED
ASE NO.
ATURE OF ACTION
FFECTS

THE MUNICIPAL COURT
LOS ANGELES
AUGUST 6, 1987
COVECREST PROPERTIES AND GORDON D. WALKER VS. JOHN A.
CAVANAUGH AND VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH
0660705, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
NOW CONSTITUTES A GOOD AND SUFFICIENT JUDGMENT LIEN ON THE
REAL PROPERTY
SAID LAND

OTICE OF THE PENDENCY OF SAID ACTION WAS
ECORDED: SEPTEMBER 9, 1987 AS INSTRUMENT NO. 87-1448447
7.
AN ABSTRACT OF JUDGMENT FOR THE AMOUNT HEREIN STATED AND ANY
THER AMOUNTS DUE
*SE NO.
C 660 705, LOS ANGELES COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
ZBTOR
JOHN A. CANAVAUGH AND VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH
"<EDITOR
GORDEN D. WALKER, COVECREST PROPERTIES
10UNT
$787,441.11
4TERED
NOVEMBER 2," 1987
•CORDED
JANUARY 20, 1988 AS INSTRUMENT NO. 88-80842
).
OTHER MATTERS OF RECORD WHICH DO NOT DESCRIBE SAID LAND, BUT
IICH, IF ANY EXIST, MAY AFFECT THE TITLE. THE NECESSARY SEARCH AND
[AMINATION WILL BE COMPLETED WHEN A STATEMENT OF INFORMATION HAS
!EN RECEIVED FROM RECORD OWNER OR OWNERS
I POLICY WILL BE ISSUED UNDER THIS ORDER UNTIL WE ARE FURNISHED WITH
ID STATEMENTS OF INFORMATION. PLEASE FORWARD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO
SIST IN THE EARLY CLEARANCE OF MATTERS OF RECORD AGAINST PERSONS WITH
E SAME OR SIMILAR NAMES.
SCRIPTION:
TS 7 AND 8 IN BLOCK 5 OF G. W. MORGAN'S SYCAMORE GROVE TRACT, IN THE CITY OF
S ANGELES, IN THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AS PER MAP
:ORDED IN BOOK 11 PAGES 57 AND 58 OF MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS, IN THE OFFICE OF
I COUNTY RECORDER OF SAID COUNTY.
TLE OF THE VESTEE HEREIN WAS ACQUIRED BY DEED RECORDED:
[OR TO SIX MONTHS FROM THE DATE HEREOF
.ICY RATE: 100 PER CENT
'23, DUP., PLATS

ADDENDUM C PA11 9

TICOR TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA
.'40 ARTESIA BLVD., TORRANCE, CALIFORNIA

90504

TEL. (213) 542-0511

ZNTION:
~< NO.:
NO. : 8544257
LE OFFICER: D. MC CRADY
ABOVE NUMBERED REPORT (INCLUDING ANY SUPPLEMENTS OR AMENDMENTS
RETO) IS HEREBY MODIFIED AND/OR SUPPLEMENTED TO REFLECT THE
LOWING ADDITIONAL ITEMS RELATING TO THE ISSUANCE OF AN AMERICAN
D TITLE ASSOCIATION LOAN FORM POLICY AS FOLLOWS:
A.L.T.A. INSPECTION DISCLOSES THE MATTERS LISTED BELOW:
AN INVESTIGATION DISCLOSES IMPROVEMENTS ON SAID LAND,
DESIGNATED AS:
TYPE OF IMPROVEMENT: A SINGLE RESIDENCE
STREET ADDRESS
: 130 EAST AVENUE 42, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
OUR A.L.T.A. LOAN POLICY, WHEN ISSUED, WILL CONTAIN C.L.T.A.
DORSEMENT NO. 100.

ADDENDUM C PA~E 10
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UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT

25-6-5

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Allegation of insolvency.
Determination of insolvency.
Allegation of insolvency.
Allegation of insolvency in a complaint in an
action to set aside a conveyance was sufficient
as against contention that it was a conclusion.
Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198,48 P.2d 513,101
A.L.R. 532 (1935).
Determination of insolvency.
The determination of insolvency under this
section is not the same as the determination of

insolvency in the bankruptcy sense, as this section requires merely a showing that the party's
a g 8 e t 8 a r e nofc 8 u f f l c i e n t to m e e t l i a b i l i t i e 8 a s
they become due

M e y e r y Generftl A m

^ ^

569 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1977).
In an action by a creditor to set aside an
allegedly fraudulent conveyance of real estate
by a debtor, the plaintiff did not demonstrate
that the debtor was insolvent where the only
evidence was that the debtor submitted two
checks that were returned unpaid. Furniture
Mfrs. Sales, Inc. v. Deamer, 680 P.2d 398
(Utah 1984).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Imputation of insolvency as defamatory, 49 A.L.R.3d 163.

Key Numbers. — Fraudulent Conveyances
*=» 57(1).

25-6-4. Value — Transfer.
(1) Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in exchange for the
transfer or obligation, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is secured
or satisfied. However, value does not include an unperformed promise made
other than in the ordinary course of the promisor's business to furnish support
to the debtor or another person.
(2) Under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b) and Section 25-6-6, a person gives a reasonably equivalent value if the person acquires an interest of the debtor in an
asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale or execution of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of the interest of the
debtor upon default under a mortgage, deed of trust, or security agreement.
(3) A transfer is made for present value if the exchange between the debtor
and the transferee is intended by them to be contemporaneous and is in fact
substantially contemporaneous.
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-4, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 4; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-4.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59
became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

25-6-5. Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before or after transfer.
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was
made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the
debtor; or
(b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for
the transfer or obligation; and the debtor:
25

25-6-5

FRAUD

(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably
small in relation to the business or transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he would incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as they
became due.
(2) To determine "actual intent" under Subsection (l)(a), consideration may
be given, among other factors, to whether:
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred
after the transfer;
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor
had been sued or threatened with suit;
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;
(0 the debtor absconded;
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
(h) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the
obligation incurred;
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred;
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial
debt was incurred; and
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a
lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.
became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
Cross-References. — Defrauding creditors
as a misdemeanor, § 76-6-511.

History: C. 1953, 25A-1-5, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 5; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-5.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Whether an assignment of an interest in an
estate was in good faith and not to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, or was made for such
purpose, depends upon the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction, as gathered from the badges of fraud present.
Boccalero v. Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126 P.2d 1063
(1942).

ANALYSIS

Assignments.
Badges of fraud.
Construction and application.
Constructive trust.
Conveyances between relatives.
Evidence.
Fair consideration.
"Good faith" transfer.
Mortgagor remaining in possession.
Parent and child.
Assignments.
Rule that sale or assignment of chattels, unaccompanied by change of possession, is fraudulent per se as to execution creditors of, or subsequent purchasers from, seller or assignor
does not necessarily apply to assignments for
benefit of creditors, but long delay in taking
possession is circumstance from which fraud
may be prima facie inferred. Snyder v. Murdock, 20 Utah 419, 59 P 91 (1899).

Badges of fraud.
Although actual fraudulent intent must be
shown to hold a conveyance fraudulent, its existence may be inferred from the presence of
certain indicia of fraud or "badges of fraud."
Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420
(Utah 1986).
"Badges of fraud," from which actual intent
may be inferred, include, inter alia, a debtor's
(1) continuing in possession and evidencing the
prerequisites of property ownership after having formally conveyed all his interest in the
property, (2) making a conveyance in anticipa-

26

